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发表于 2016-5-7 13:13:20
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17世纪初,欧洲的战略家们开始思索更加近似于实际战役的国际象棋(兵棋)玩法,如此棋局可以提供更加完满的训练。起初只是扩大了战场(棋盘),使得军种更加多样化包括代表了骑兵、炮兵和步兵的棋子。到18世纪时,棋盘上开始划分出不同的地形,用不同的颜色标记,或者把格子形的棋盘转换成一张比例地图。部队行军速度的差别被写入规则中,取决于它们是步兵还是骑兵,是过草地还是翻越高山。对弈者必须对基本的后勤负责,确保补给线畅通以满足指战员们的供给。
But that was just the beginning. The full transformation from chess to war games occurred in the 19th century, when a Prussian lieutenant named Georg von Reisswitz layered in aspects of a sandbox game invented by his father. The elder Reisswitz’s game was played with ranks of toy soldiers engaged in mock combat, where the outcomes of ambushes and battles were decided by dice. (The results of each dice throw were tallied according to real battlefield statistics, specifying the range of casualties to be expected in any given scenario.) The young lieutenant replaced his father’s sandbox battlefield with a flat topographic map, across which markers representing companies and units could be advanced at the rate permitted by the terrain. As in real warfare, neither side had total knowledge of the conflict. Each played on a separate board, with an umpire making his way back and forth. Rules derived from battlefield experience determined how much the umpire allowed each side to see of the opposition. Those rules also guided the dice-thrown results of combat. The game was known as kriegsspiel.
但这只是开了个头。从国际象棋蜕变为现代军事游戏的兵棋推演,发生在19世纪初,普鲁士陆军中尉乔治·冯·莱斯维茨改进了他父亲发明的一种沙盘游戏,分出不同的层次。老莱斯维茨的游戏是由不同军衔的玩具兵们参与以模仿战斗而伏击或对阵的结果都由骰子来决定。(每次掷出骰子的结果都按照真实的战地策略被记入分数,以表明任何一种给定的部署方案都有一定的伤亡减员区间),年轻的中尉用一张比例地图代替了他父亲用过的战场沙盘,代表不同的连队和战斗群的棋子在其上对垒,其行军速度取决于地形。犹如在真实的战争里,双方都不了解冲突的全部情形。各方都有一块飞地,每走一步都有一个裁判(第三方)做出仲裁决定其下一步是前进还是后退。游戏规则起源与战场经验,可以让裁判决定各方对对手的了解程度。这些规则也引导了掷骰子博弈的结果。这款军事游以“德国兵棋”之名闻于世。
Germany used war games to invent the blitzkrieg, Japan to occupy Pacific island outposts, and the U.S. to distinguish the Marine Corps.
德国人用兵棋推演游戏发明了“闪电战,日本用兵棋推演占领了太平洋的前哨岛屿,美国则用它训练出卓越的海军陆战队。
The verisimilitude of kriegsspiel impressed Karl von Muffling, the Prussian chief of staff, when Reisswitz demonstrated his game in 1824. Muffling placed an article in the Prussian military weekly asserting that kriegsspiel balanced the “frivolous demands of a game” with the “serious business of war,” and had game boards dispatched to every regiment. Thirteen years later, Muffling’s successor, Helmuth von Moltke, promoted kriegsspiel even more, making the game central to officer training by periodically bringing the whole War College out to the Prussian border in order to game hypothetical enemy invasions. The game would be played on a map corresponding to the surrounding landscape. Precise data for each maneuver would be collected by marching the local garrison through the formations on the game board. On this basis, Moltke not only provided training but also supplied tactical plans for the garrison in case of actual invasion.
1824年莱斯维茨演示了他的兵棋推演游戏,其逼真性令普鲁士总参谋长冯·米夫林元帅印象深刻。冯·米夫林在普鲁士军事周刊上发表了一篇文章,断定兵棋以“严肃的战争事务”对冲了“游戏中无关紧要的需要”,并且把推演棋盘分发到每个团。13年后,冯·米夫林的后任,赫尔姆斯 冯 莫德克,进一步推广了兵棋推演,使得其被载入官方训练条例的科目中,他把整个参谋本部(普鲁士总参谋部)带到普鲁士边境以模拟博弈出假想的敌军入侵情况。两支队伍在一张比例地图上面对面对垒。以穿越棋盘上不同区域的方式模拟当地驻军的部署,如此每次机动的精确数据就被收集起来。在此基础上, 莫德克不仅提供了训练条令,而且为卫戍部队提供了敌军入侵实际情形下的战术条令。
Yet as the realism of kriegsspiel increased, the rules governing it—and the effort of playing it—threatened to overwhelm war gaming. Partly this was a practical issue: The more time required to set up and play out a scenario, the smaller the number of scenarios that could be explored. But there was also the deeper risk that greater verisimilitude would paradoxically make gameplay less relevant. It was the opposite of the issue with chess, where the lessons learned were universal yet abstract. In kriegsspiel, the lessons were often so concrete as to be sui generis. And even if the perfect occasion arose for applying a war-gamed tactic, the complexity of kriegsspiel made it difficult to determine whether the results were biased by how the rules interacted.
随着兵棋推演的实用性不断增强,驾驭它的规则以及它产生的效用,几乎完胜战争博弈游戏。但它也存在着深层次的风险,即逼真度越大,其与棋局的关联性就越小。它也不同于下国际象棋,后者训练科目甚至更加抽象。兵棋推演的科目是具体的、自成一格的。尽管它是进行精密的战场策略推演游戏,“德国兵棋”的复杂性使得它难以确定结果是否因为规则间相互作用方式而存在着偏差。
In 1876, one of Moltke’s officers, Colonel Julius von Verdy du Vernois, proposed an alternative: Replace the rules with the judgment of experienced umpires. “Free war games,” as they were known, could be played in two adjoining rooms with nothing more than a pair of topographical maps and two sets of markers. The umpire passed back and forth between teams, collecting orders and providing intelligence. Instead of using charts, players used their instinct to estimate how fast troops could advance, and the outcomes of battles were decided—without dice or casualty tables—at the umpire’s own discretion.
This arrangement made the games fast like actual warfare, and the umpire knew the reason for his decisions, which meant he could help players to understand the outcome at any level of abstraction. The game was a prelude to discussion. Though Reisswitz-style games continued to be played, Verdy’s influence was profound. His free kriegsspiel established a continuum from rigidity to openness, just as Reisswitz’s rigid kriegsspiel established a continuum from abstraction to realism.
1876年莫德克手下的军官,少校参谋Julius von Verdy du Vernois, 提出一种备用方案:以有经验的裁判的判断替换掉这些规则。“自由的战争博弈游戏”,以此得名,可以在两个比邻房间里进行对垒,只需要两份一模一样的比例地图以及两套一模一样的兵棋。裁判在两队之间来回奔波,收集指令,提供情报。对垒者以直觉而不是以图表去估算部队行军速度,并且由裁判自己判定战役的结果,不需要用骰子或伤亡减员报表。
这种编排令推演与实际的战争同步进行,且裁判知道自己判定的理由,这意味着他可以帮助对垒的玩家们以各种抽象方式去理解结果。
推演是讨论的前提。尽管一直被称为“莱斯维茨兵棋”,但Verdy少校的改良影响深远。他的自由兵棋建立了一个由僵化到开放的连续的推演体系,而莱斯维茨的僵化的兵棋则确立了一个从抽象到具象的连续的推演体系。
Games could be configured at any point along these two axes, optimized according to what the commander wished to achieve. And as war-gaming developed, expectations increased. Games could be used for training officers, building camaraderie, identifying leaders, understanding enemies, anticipating conflicts, inventing tactics, testing strategies, predicting outcomes. In the United States, where kriegsspiel was imported in 1887, one of the first questions was logistical. The Naval War College gamed different scenarios to determine whether fuel supplies for battleships should be shifted from coal to oil. The games indicated that a switchover would be advantageous. The Navy did it, fortuitously modernizing their fleet in time for World War I.
推演可以配置在上述这两个轴的任何节点上,按照指挥员期望达到的意愿进行优化。随着战争模拟推演游戏的发展,预期效益也在增长。
这类游戏可以用来训练军官,建立战友情谊,甄选指挥员,理解敌方的意图,预见冲突,发明战术,测试战略,预期结果。
1887年德国兵棋被引进美国。首要触及的是后勤问题。美国海军军事学院推演了不同的方案,以确定战舰的燃料补给应该采用煤还是油。推演的结果显示快速换能将是有利的。海军照着做了,意外地使得他们的军舰及时地现代化,赶上了第一次世界大战。
In Europe, kriegsspiel was widely used to develop strategies for ground war. Given Prussian tradition—and German delusions of grandeur—Germany was especially active, developing whole file cabinets of battle plans. One of the most promising played out the invasions of Holland and Belgium in order to quash the French army before the British could assist. The game determined that Germany would triumph against France as long as ammunition could be rapidly replenished. For this purpose, Germany built the world’s first motorized supply battalions, deployed in 1914. And the plan might have worked brilliantly, if the only players had been the German and French armies. But the German kriegsspiel failed to factor in the pride of Belgian civilians, who proved ready and able saboteurs—even of their own railroads—upsetting German momentum. Even more catastrophic, the game left out diplomacy which, by way of alliances, brought America into the war—and not on the side of the Reich.
在欧洲,德国兵棋广泛用于发展基础战略。德国人从普鲁士那里继承了好大喜功的传统,德国尤其活跃,制定了一揽子战争计划。其中最有前途的是制定出入侵荷兰和比利时的计划以在英军增援前碾压法军军力。推演显示只要弹药能够被快速填装补充,则德国在对法作战中全胜。为了这个目标,德国建立了世界上第一支摩托化补给大队,于1914年开始部署。只要博弈双方是德军和法军,这项方案就战绩辉煌。但是德国兵棋推演没有顾及骄傲的比利时人民的影响因素,后者已经被证实是能干的突击队,即使对自家铁路也毫不手软,可以扰乱德国的攻势。更具毁灭性的是,推演得出了一种部署,美国将加入同盟国,介入战争,而不是站在第三帝国一边。
The defeat of Germany in World War I suggested the need for another dimension in war games: a axis. Depending on the circumstances, war games needed to model the non-military implications of military actions, and to do so from the local to the global scale. Only when all three axes were properly accounted for could a game function meaningfully. And the appropriate level of abstraction, openness, and inclusiveness were different for every situation and every purpose.
德国在一战中的战败表明在战争推演博弈中还需要考虑另一个维度:社会政治轴。战争推演必须依照环境为军事行动的非军事内涵建模,而且将此从本土推及全球。只有当三个轴都被正确地估算后,推演才可能真正有意义。而且依照不同的局面,不同的目标适当程度地变更抽象性、开放性以及包容性。
Keats_BR-1-kriegsspiel
WORLD OF WARCRAFT, OLD SCHOOL: Games got serious with kriegsspiel (German for war game), designed by a Prussian lieutenant. Each side advanced troops at a rate permitted by a certain terrain. Rules were derived from real battlefield experiences; the game became central to real military training.Courtesy of Look and Learn
致敬致意战车世界,老式学派:
采用普鲁士中尉设计的德国兵棋令军事推演变得严肃。对垒各方依照地形允许的速度部署部队。兵棋推演规则起源于真实的战场经验;兵棋推演由此进入真正的军事训练条令。
All the major militaries gamed at multiple levels in the interwar period, with varied results. Germany successfully used war games to invent the blitzkrieg, Japan gamed the maneuvers their navy would later use to occupy Pacific island outposts, and the U.S. gamed the amphibious tactics that distinguished the Marine Corps. But games delving into politics were more treacherous. Free games played by Germany in the early ’30s—in which participants included diplomats, industrialists, and journalists—failed even to protect the Weimar Republic from internal collapse.
在战时,大型的军事推演都是多方参与的,产生出多种可变的结果。德国成功地应用战争推演发明了闪电战,日本在战棋游戏中玩出了他们的海军将占领太平洋前哨岛屿这一部署前景,美国推演出令海军陆战队变得卓越的两栖战术。但对于政治的推演则更为波谲云诡。德国人在1930年代搞了所谓自由博弈的的推演----参加者包括外交官,工业家和记者,却不能保护魏玛共和国从内部崩溃。
In Japan, the Total War Research Institute held political-military games in 1941 that simulated the political interests and military power of countries including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and America. The games correctly predicted a Japanese defeat of England in the Far East, incorrectly anticipated a German victory over the U.S.S.R., and utterly discounted the resolve of the United States. Certainly there was no premonition of how political conditions in Nazi Germany would give America the scientific brainpower behind the Manhattan Project, ultimately leading to the atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The predictive aims of the 1941 games ended in colossal failure. However, the real problem had less to do with game mechanics or faulty data than the belief that any global interplay of cause and effect could be decisively modeled.
在日本,战争总动员研究机构在1941年进行了政治推演以模拟包括苏联,大不列颠,和美国在内各国的政治利益与国家军力。推演准确预示日本将在远东地区打败英国,却不准确地预示德国将完胜苏联,而且彻底地忽视了美国的决心。当时肯定没有预兆昭示纳粹德国的政治环境将使美国在曼哈顿计划(原子弹建造计划)之后获得许多一流的科学头脑,并终将导致美国在长崎和广岛投放原子弹。1941年的推演终结于异常巨大的失败中。然而,现实问题很少采用推演机制,或者说缺损的数据可以被明确地建模,但对于全球交互作用效应的必然信念却无法建模。
Arguably the United States used war games most effectively in World War II because the U.S. military was most attentive to their limitations. A post-war assessment by Admiral Chester Nimitz provides some insight into the American approach. “The war with Japan had been [enacted] in the game room here by so many people in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze,” he said. In other words, the U.S. wasn’t presuming to predict the future—to simulate geopolitics fraught with unknown unknowns—but rather was creating a vast database of short-term hypotheticals, an industrial-strength version of what Helmuth von Moltke once attempted in Prussia. American gaming explored the problem space of war in the ’40s, and the games produced heuristics, or rules of thumb. The only limitation was the American military imagination, which was simply too American to conceive of Japanese suicide missions.
也就是说,美国的战争推演在第二次世界大战时候做得最有效因为美军非常在意自己的局限性。海军上将尼米兹的战后评语使得我们得以洞察美国的途径。
“在这里,与日本的战争在作战室里有许多人参与推演,以如此多的不同方式,因为战争中一切皆有可能,没有令人吃惊的事---除了自杀式的神风特攻队员绝对属于例外,”他说道。
换句话说,美国不会想当然地预测未来----模拟地缘政治充满着不可知之不可知--但怎么都好过建立一个短期假设的巨大数据库,即赫尔姆斯 冯 莫德克在普鲁士所为的工业进阶版。1940年代美国的推演探索了战争问题的范畴,这些推演产生了启示,或者经验法则。唯一的局限在于美国的军事构想,过于美国化以至于无法理解日本的自杀式攻击。
This exploratory approach was carried forward into the Cold War, reinforced by the circumstances of nuclear armament. The fundamental problem faced by both the U.S. and Soviet militaries in the 1950s and ’60s was aptly summed up by the RAND physicist Herman Kahn.3 When his expertise was questioned by military officials, he’d retort, “How many thermonuclear wars have you fought recently?”
这个解释途径是面向冷战展开的,并且由核军备环境强化背书。1950年代和1960年代,美苏双方军事上面临的根本问题由兰德公司的物理学家 Herman Kahn进行了适当的小结。当他的专业资质遭受军官们的质疑时候,他反唇相讥,“您最近打过多少次热核武器战争?”
The nuclear era was entirely unprecedented, and one wrong decision could cause the end of civilization. There was an urgent need to explore absolutely every eventuality while acknowledging that many eventualities couldn’t possibly be foreseen. The Pentagon gamely simulated Joseph Stalin’s sudden death and a Soviet first strike on Inauguration Day, role-played by mid-level military and government officials. The purpose of this free gaming was to develop intuitions: Since a good model would need to account for everything in the world—given that nuclear war was inherently global—good models were all but unbuildable. Instead the Pentagon opted for many inadequate simulations and gave low credence to any of them. In the words of one Navy analyst, gaming was a “training device for aiding intuitional development.” RAND referred to it as “anticipatory experience.”
核子时代是史无前例的,一个错误的决定就可能导致文明的终结。绝对是迫切需要探索每一种不测之事的可能性,并且要认识到许多的不测是不可预见的。(不怕一万,只怕万一)。五角大楼推演模拟了斯大林的突然死亡以及在新领导人就职当天前苏联的第一次罢工,由中层的政府官员和军官进行角色扮演。这次自由博弈推演的目的是发展直觉:既然一个好的模型可以解释世上万物--假定核战争必然是全球化的----好的模型尽管可以阐释万物却是无法构建万物的。
相反,五角大楼倾向于许多非充分条件下的模拟推演,对其中任何一种都赋予较低的可信度。以海军军情分析者的话说是,推演是“帮助直觉发展的训练装置”,兰德公司将其命名为“提早发生的经验”。
Yet inevitably American government and military leaders wanted to master the Cold War. They sought victory over communism. Advances in computing stoked that ambition, as did progress in game theory as a model for non-zero sum games.
尽管如此,美国政府和军事首脑依然不可避免地企图掌控冷战。他们渴求战胜共产主义的胜利。计算机科学的进步更加振奋了这种野心,例如在博弈论领域非零和博弈模式取得的一些进展。
Robert F. Kennedy saw games as an alternative to political debate in which all interests could role-play their way to civil rights.
罗伯特. 肯尼迪把模拟推演视为政治辩论的备用或替代方法,其中的各个利益关联方都可以按照他们对于公民权的理解进行角色扮演。
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